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Abstract
Growing economic and psychological evidence documents e¤ects of target set-
ting on levels of e¤ort and risk-taking, even in the absence of a monetary reward
for attaining the target. I explore a principal-agent environment in which the
principal sets the agent a performance target, and the agents intrinsic moti-
vation to work is inuenced by their performance relative to the target. When
the agent has prospect theory preferences relative to the target I show that a
performance target can induce greater e¤ort, but, when set too high, it even-
tually induces lower e¤ort. Also, the agents preferences for risk-taking hinge
on whether the target is set above or below expected output. I nd that the
principals optimal target exceeds expected output.
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1 Introduction
Performance targets are a pervasive feature of the modern corporation. In standard
principal-agent theory a performance target can act as an incentive device if a mone-
tary reward is linked to achievement of the target. As the salience of the target level
derives entirely from the monetary reward for its achievement, a performance target
absent such a monetary reward would have no implications for behavior. However,
this approach is inconsistent with an established psychological literature - reviewed
in Locke and Latham (2002) - and an emerging economic literature (Camerer et al.,
1997; Clark and Oswald, 1998; Mas 2006; Rablen, 2008; Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003)
- that documents how a performance target in itself can inuence economic behavior,
even in the absence of a monetary reward contingent upon its achievement.
A reconciliation of the principal-agent approach with the above evidence is possible if
pay is recognized as only one of many determinants of an individuals motivation to
work. For instance, a substantial literature in psychology argues that an individuals
motivation to work can be decomposed into intrinsic and extrinsic components (e.g.
Deci, 1971, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985). While the extrinsic component of motivation
includes monetary rewards, the idea of intrinsic motivation is that work can also
provide its own inherent rewards.
In economics the idea that extrinsic rewards are not the only instrument through
which individuals can be motivated to exert e¤ort has taken longer to emerge, but is
now receiving growing attention. Frey (1997a,b) uses the concept of intrinsic moti-
vation to propose a theory in which individuals may perform work for works sake.
The managers interviewed in Bewley (1999) emphasize that relying solely on wage
motivation is unwise. Consistent with this, Sen (1977, p. 101) argues that to run an
organization entirely on incentives to personal gain is pretty much a hopeless task.
Studies of happiness are making it increasingly clear that work itself can be utility
enhancing: unemployment (not employment) is associated with high levels of mental
distress (Clark, 2003; Clark and Oswald 1994; Di Tella et al., 2003). Last, Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000a,b) present empirical evidence consistent with the idea that in-
dividuals can have an intrinsic motivation to work, but that such motivation can be
crowded-out by extrinsic rewards.1
1Further indicative evidence is provided by Jensen and Murphy (1990), who establish empirically
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This paper examines the behavioral implications of a performance target in a simple
principal-agent setting. In particular I consider how, by inuencing the agents intrin-
sic motivation to work, the target can a¤ect preferences for e¤ort and risk-taking. I
go on to examine how, given the behavior of the agent, the principal should optimally
set the performance target.
There are several ways a performance target might inuence intrinsic motivation. The
cognitive evaluation theory of Deci (1975) argues that perceived competence is an
important determinant of intrinsic motivation. Consistent with this, individuals who
perceive themselves to be performing well in their job tend to have higher intrinsic
motivation and report higher levels of job satisfaction (Barrick and Mount, 1991;
Judge et al., 2001). One possibility is that when a performance target is set, it
becomes a yardstick that can importantly a¤ect an individuals perceived competence.
Achieving the target can act as a signal of competence, while failure to achieve the
target can act as a signal of a lack of competence. Additionally, individuals who
achieve the target level may have their intrinsic motivation buttressed by praise from
superiors, while failure to achieve the target might reduce intrinsic motivation through
negative feedback (Deci, 1975; Vallerand and Reid, 1984).
The above arguments suggest that performance relative to the target is an important
determinant of intrinsic motivation to work. For a level of output q and a target level
of output t, I therefore write an individuals intrinsic motivation to work as I [q − t,Ψ],
where Ψ is a vector containing all other determinants of the intrinsic motivation to
work. As I take intrinsic motivation to be reference-dependent with respect to t, I
suppose that I [] satises the properties of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In particular, the prospect theory functional
implies diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion with respect to outcomes above and
below the target level.
Allowing for loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity can be justied on a number of
grounds. First, there is now an abundance of empirical and experimental evidence
conrming these two properties of the prospect theory functional (see e.g. Abdellaoui,
2000; Laughhann et al., 1980; Mezias, 1988; Payne et al., 1981; Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1992; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996, 1999). Second, these properties can explain
that pay-for-performance is applied less broadly, and with less intensity, than proposed by principal-
agent theory.
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otherwise puzzling empirical phenomena such as the reection e¤ect (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979); the disparity between measures of willingness to pay and willingness
to accept (Bateman et al., 1997); and the goal gradient e¤ect, whereby agents expend
more e¤ort as they approach a target (Heath et al., 1999; Hull, 1932; Kivetz et al.,
2006). Third, I show that if I [] exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity the
present model is able to t a range of psychological evidence on e¤ort, risk-taking
and target-setting, but not if I [] is globally concave as is conventionally assumed in
economic theory.
With this approach I predict an inverse-∪ shaped relationship between the target
level and e¤ort - consistent with ndings in the psychological literature on target
setting. This e¤ect obtains even though I assume no monetary reward from achiev-
ing the target. I also nd that increasing the target level of performance increases
the agents preference for risk-taking - also consistent with the empirical ndings of
the psychological literature. This e¤ect obtains even though the model assumes a
complete decoupling of risk-taking from expected output.
Additionally, I nd that the relationship between the target level and risk-taking
hinges on whether the target level lies above or below expected output: below ex-
pected output the agent requires a positive risk premium to bear risk, but above
expected output the agent will nd it optimal to bear some degree of risk for no
compensatory risk premium.
If the agent is allowed to choose simultaneously a preferred level of e¤ort and a
preferred level of risk, I nd that, when the target level exceeds expected output,
e¤ort and risk-taking are substitutes: the agent responds to further increases in the
performance target by reducing her e¤ort, and increasing her exposure to risk. The
principals optimal choice of the target level is shown to exceed the equilibrium level of
expected output, as the principal can exploit the agents loss aversion to below-target
outcomes.
In psychology, an earlier study by Wu et al. (2004) examines goal driven behavior
under prospect theory preferences, but under conditions of certainty, and not within
a principal-agent framework. The authors nd that easy goals can improve per-
formance and hard goals can worsen performance - a result mirrored in this paper
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- but using somewhat di¤erent assumptions (agents are assumed to be myopic in a
certain sense).
In economics, contributions that incorporate elements of prospect theory in a principal-
agent setting include Herweg et al. (2008), de Meza and Webb (2007), Dittmann et
al. (forthcoming) and Iantchev (2005).2 These studies examine the implications for
the optimal incentive scheme if agents are loss averse over compensation amounts
that fall below their reference level. Unlike these studies, here I focus not on the
extrinsic motivation to work captured by the optimal incentive scheme, but on how
the target level itself can inuence behavior through intrinsic motivation, and the
related question of how the principal should respond to this behavior in setting the
performance target.
The analysis is also related to a wider literature that incorporates prospect theory
preferences with an endogenous reference level: Barberis et al. (2001) apply the model
to asset prices; Berkelaar et al. (2004) to portfolio choice; Kanbur et al. (2008) to
optimal taxation; and Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) to tax compliance. However,
the present model di¤ers from the above in the sense that the target level is only
endogenous with respect to the principal, not to the agent.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Sections 2 and 3 outline a simple principal-agent
model based on that of Akerlof (1982). Section 4 explores the predictions of the model
for the e¤ort and risk-taking behavior of the agent, and the principals optimal choice
of the performance target. Section 5 concludes.
2 Targets, E¤ort and Risk-Taking
A novel feature of the present analysis is that, as well as allowing the agent to make a
choice of e¤ort, I allow the agent also to choose among production strategies that in-
volve di¤ering degrees of risk. Underlying this approach is the idea that in a world of
incomplete contracts and informational asymmetries, the agent is able to exercise dis-
cretion over certain aspects of her behavior. Risk-taking behavior by managers in the
corporate environment is typically constrained from both sides: risk cannot typically
2Studies by Rayo and Becker (2007) and Rablen (2009) also consider the choice of a target or
reference level in a principal-agent framework. However, these studies lack a ready interpretation in
the context of the rm.
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be eliminated entirely as managers face an element of systematic risk: rms operate
in an inherently risky environment. Equally, systems are normally in place to limit
discretionary risk-taking by managers. Nevertheless, within these two constraints,
managers can exercise discretion as to the riskiness of the strategies they employ. In
this sense it is possible to view the agent as being able to expose the principal to a
degree of unsystematic risk in addition to the systematic risk she necessarily faces.
A further feature of the model is that the principal is able to set the agents per-
formance target. My idea here is that in corporate environments, performance tar-
gets are typically imposed hierarchically, with each layer in the hierarchy responsible
for setting targets for the level below. For instance, upon entering a university an
academic will typically be informed by the Director of Research of the quality of
publications expected of them. Although in some instances sub-ordinates may be
permitted to exert a degree of inuence upon the targets set by their superior - in-
deed this is considered best practice - the targets set are ultimately at the discretion
of the superior. Therefore, allowing the principal complete discretion over the agents
performance target should be seen as a simplication, but one that I argue is a close
approximation to a more realistic specication.
As the above discussion should make clear, my interpretation of the target level di¤ers
from that of the earlier literature. For instance, recent studies of the labor supply of
taxi-drivers (Camerer et al., 1997; Chou, 2002; Farber, 2008; Fehr and Goette, 2007)
require a di¤erent interpretation of the target level, for as self-employed individuals,
taxi-drivers are able to determine their own performance targets. The studies by
Herweg et al. (2008), de Meza and Webb (2007) and Iantchev (2005) also view
the reference level as being determined by the agent, with the principal able only
to inuence the agents choice indirectly through her choice of the incentive scheme.
These studies therefore do not capture the hierarchical process of target setting within
the rm that I have in mind.
3 A Model
My model is a simple principal-agent setting that loosely follows the framework of
Akerlof (1982). In the rst period, the principal decides the agents performance
target t. To focus on the e¤ect of the performance target on intrinsic motivation,
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I remove any extrinsic considerations by supposing that achievement of the target
carries no conditional monetary reward. This also allows the model to replicate the
setting employed in the psychological literature on target setting. However, it should
be noted that the presence of a monetary reward only sharpens the incentive e¤ects
with respect to e¤ort that I go on to describe. In the second period, the agent chooses
a level of e¤ort and a preferred level of risk, taking as given the performance target
set by the principal.
3.1 Preferences
Following arguments made in the Introduction, I suppose the agent has an intrinsic
motivation to work function given by I [q − t,Ψ], where q is realized output, and Ψ
captures all other determinants of the agents intrinsic motivation to work. Since I
hold all elements of Ψ constant in what follows, herein I write intrinsic motivation
as simply I [q − t]. An obvious deciency of this specication is that it ignores the
possibility that the agent may also derive intrinsic motivation in some part from their
absolute performance. However, I choose to work with the present form so as to focus
attention on the role of the target level, and to retain the overall simplicity of the
presentation.
Following prospect theory I make the following assumptions on I []:
A0. I [x] is continuous for all x, twice di¤erentiable for x 6= 0, and I [0] = 0.
A1. I [x] is strictly increasing.
A2. I ′ [x] < I ′ [−x] for x > 0.
A3. I ′′ [x] < 0 for x > 0 and I ′′ [x] > 0 for x < 0.
Assumptions A0 and A1 are standard technical assumptions. Assumption A2 is loss
aversion, and implies that the loss of intrinsic motivation from a below-target outcome
exceeds the gain in intrinsic motivation from an equivalent above-target outcome. As-
sumption A3 is diminishing sensitivity, which requires that marginal intrinsic motiva-
tion is a decreasing function in distance from the target level. Diminishing sensitivity
implies risk seeking preferences over below-target outcomes and risk averse prefer-
ences over above-target outcomes. Together, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity
imply a kink-point at the target level of output.
In the light of widespread evidence of risk aversion amongst rms (see e.g. Hubbard,
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1998) I suppose that the principal derives utility from prot according to the function
V [π], where V ′ > 0 and V ′′ < 0.
3.2 Production Environment
The agent expends an amount of e¤ort e which yields an uncertain level of output
q ≡ e + ε, where ε is a random output shock.3 E¤ort is assumed to be costly, which
is captured by a cost function c[e], where it is assumed that c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0.
The total uncertainty in production is measured by the parameter A, which is com-
posed of a systematic element, measured by α ≤ A, and an unsystematic element,
measured by A−α ≥ 0. To capture this idea as simply as possible I assume that ε is
uniformly distributed on the interval [−A,A]. The agent is able to choose A, subject
to the constraint that A ≥ α. By choosing ε to have a zero mean, the model implies
a complete decoupling of risk-taking from expected output. I do this to make clear
that any preference for risk-taking observed in the model cannot be explained via the
standard trade-o¤ between risk and expected return.
3.3 Agents Problem
I assume a simple production environment that introduces uncertainty into the earlier
framework of Wu et al. (2004). The problem facing the agent is to choose a level of
e¤ort, and an optimal level of unsystematic risk. Although I [] is not di¤erentiable at
the origin, under assumptions A0-A3 it is integrable. The agents problem is therefore
given by
max
A,e
1
2A
AZ
−A
I [e+ ε− t] dε− c [e] s.t. A ≥ α. (1)
However, it is often more instructive to work with the unconstrained version of (1)
given by
max
a,e
1
2a
aZ
−a
I [e+ ε− t] dε− c [e] , (2)
3I have also investigated allowing for productivity shocks that interact multiplicatively with e¤ort.
However, this only complicates the results without changing the qualitative conclusions.
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where a ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the agents preferred level of risk. If (a, e [a]) is a
solution to the unconstrained problem in (2) then a solution to the agents constrained
problem in (1) is given by:
A =

α
a
a < α
a ≥ α
e [A] =

e [α]
e [a]
a < α
a ≥ α
. (3)
It can be seen that when the level of systematic risk exceeds the agents preferred
level of risk there is no incentive for the agent to generate additional unsystematic
risk. However, if the agents preferred level of risk exceeds the systematic risk, she
will respond by creating additional unsystematic risk.
To facilitate analysis I can rewrite the unconstrained problem in (2) as:
max
a,e
1
2a
Z[a,e,t]Z
Y [a,e,t]
I [ϕ] dϕ− c [e] , (4)
where
Y [a, e, t] ≡ e− a− t; Z [a, e, t] ≡ e+ a− t. (5)
The rst-order conditions are then:
e :
I [Z [a, e, t]]− I [Y [a, e, t]]
2a
= c′ [e] ; (6)
a : a (I [Z [a, e, t]] + I [Y [a, e, t]]) =
Z[a,e,t]Z
Y [a,e,t]
I [ϕ] dϕ. (7)
The second-order conditions (in this instance su¢cient for an interior maximum) are:
I ′ [Z]− I ′ [Y ]
2a
− c′′ [e] < 0; (8)
−2a (I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z]) < 0; (9)
where, as is the case throughout, the derivatives of I [] are dened for Y, Z 6= 0.
Because diminishing sensitivity implies convex intrinsic motivation over below-target
outcomes, the second-order condition for e¤ort in (8) is not guaranteed to hold. If (8)
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is not satised, then the optimal e¤ort is either zero, or it is unbounded above. From
a positive standpoint, neither of these possible outcomes is attractive. However,
so long as the cost function is su¢ciently convex I may proceed under the more
plausible assumption of an interior maximum for e¤ort. The second-order condition
for risk in (9) shows that the agents preferred risk level must satisfy the property
that I ′ [Y ] > I ′ [Z].
3.4 Principals Problem
The problem of the principal is to choose the agents output target t to maximize
expected utility, subject to the behavioral response of the agent, as summarized by
(3), (6) and (7). The principals expected utility is given by:
1
2A [t]
A[t]Z
−A[t]
V [(p− w) (e [t] + ε)] dε, (10)
where w is the piece-rate paid per unit of output, p ≥ w is the market price of a
unit of output, and (A [t] , e [t]) are respectively the agents optimal choice of risk and
e¤ort.
4 Analysis
4.1 Targets and E¤ort
Before proceeding to analyze the simultaneous choice of e¤ort and unsystematic risk
by the agent it is rst instructive to examine these two choices separately. In par-
ticular, it is helpful to understand the role of the target level in inuencing these
choices.
A large psychological literature examines the question of the relationship between
targets and e¤ort on costly tasks. On both physical (Bandura and Cervone, 1983;
Ness and Patton, 1979) and cognitive (Bryan and Locke, 1967; Locke et al., 1970)
tasks, subjects asked to achieve a target level of performance outperform subjects
simply told to do their best. These results are found both inside and outside the
laboratory environment: woods workers given specic targets recorded signicantly
higher levels of productivity than did those in a do your best condition (Latham and
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Baldes, 1975; Latham and Kinne, 1974; Ronan et al., 1973).4 Levels of persistence
on di¢cult tasks are found to increase as the target level is raised (Hall et al., 1987;
LaPorte and Nath, 1976; Stevenson et al., 1984). Consistent with these ndings,
Terpstra and Rozell (1994) nd a positive relationship between reported protability
and use of target setting in questionnaire data from one thousand US employers.5
However, the psychological literature also nds that when the target level becomes
excessively high, further increases in the target result in reduced levels of e¤ort (Atkin-
son, 1958; Erez and Zidon, 1984; Locke and Latham, 1990). The psychological evi-
dence therefore points to an asymmetric inverse-∪ shaped relationship between the
target level and e¤ort: over most of the domain, e¤ort rises with the target, but
eventually begins to fall. This literature attributes the eventual decline of e¤ort to a
lapse in commitment to the target level, once it is seen as unattainable. I, however,
o¤er an explanation based on the conventional concept of marginal utility.
These ndings can be investigated in my model through the agents rst-order condi-
tion for e¤ort in (6), which indicates that the optimal e¤ort is a function of the slope
of the chord through I [Y ] and I [Z]. To focus on e¤ort, suppose here that I can treat
a > 0 as an exogenous variable. In that case, by di¤erentiating (6) with respect to
t, I obtain the response of e¤ort to a change in the target level (subscripts denote
partial derivatives) as:
et = −
(I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z])
I ′ [Z]− I ′ [Y ]− 2ac′′ [e]
. (11)
Since the denominator of (11) is negative by the assumption of an interior maximum,
I have the following Proposition (all proofs being in the Appendix):
Proposition 1 For a xed level of risk the relationship between e¤ort and the target
level is positive at low target levels and negative at high target levels:
Low t : Z > Y > 0⇒ et > 0
Intermediate t : Z > 0 > Y ⇒ et ≷ 0⇔ I
′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z] ≷ 0
High t : 0 > Z > Y ⇒ et < 0
4Mento et al. (1987) and Tubbs (1986) provide supportive meta-analyses from a wide range of
further studies.
5Much practical literature on personnel management and motivation (e.g. Hiam, 1999; Spitzer,
1995) also advocates the setting of performance targets to employees as a non-monetary form of
motivation, as do organizations such as Business Link, the UK governments business advisory
service.
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Proposition 1 shows that the model predicts the inverse-∪ shaped relationship between
the target level and e¤ort found in the psychological literature: e¤ort is increasing for
low target levels (in which optimal e¤ort is su¢ciently high that the target is exceeded
even if the worst shock realizes) and decreasing for high target levels (in which the
target level is not achieved even if the highest shock realizes). The e¤ort maximum
occurs at some intermediate target level which is attained with a probability strictly
between zero and one at the optimum e¤ort. The key to the result is diminishing
sensitivity: when output is above the target level (low t) raising t moves output
closer to the target level, so increasing marginal intrinsic motivation. Conversely,
when output is below the target level (high t) raising t moves output further from
the target level, so decreasing marginal intrinsic motivation. Note that if I [] is a
standard concave function, I do not generate this prediction. Rather, it always holds
that I ′ [Y ] > I ′ [Z], with the consequence that e¤ort is everywhere increasing in the
target level.
4.2 Targets and Risk-taking
In this section I now treat e¤ort as exogenous and examine the relationship between
risk-taking and the target level. A closely related psychological literature to that
on targets and e¤ort has studied the relationship between targets and risk-taking.
Experimental evidence from psychology nds that higher targets induce higher levels
of risk-taking (Knight et al., 2001; Larrick et al., 2009). More generally, there is
also evidence that the further agents are from achieving the target, the more they are
willing to take risks. Studies of race track betting document the common phenomenon
that bettors, when losing, tend to bet more and more on longer odds horses (Hausch
et al., 1981; McGlothlin, 1956). Managers claim to take more risks when their rm
is missing performance targets than when it is meeting them (MacCrimmon and
Wehrung, 1986; Shapira, 1995). Consistent with this, Bowman (1980, 1982) nds
that less protable rms within industries exhibit higher variances in their operations
and prots.6
There are also ndings that traders and fund managers who perform poorly in the
rst half of their regular performance cycle tend to increase the riskiness of their
6There are parallels too in the behavior of birds, where studies show that they become increasingly
risk prone as food levels are manipulated downward below energy expenditure levels (Caraco and
Lima, 1985).
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portfolio in the second half of the cycle (Brown et al., 1996; Shapira, 2002), although
in these studies attainment of the performance target is linked to payouts.
These ndings can be investigated in the model through the agents rst-order condi-
tion for risk in (7). As the parameter a is a mean-preserving spread, expected output
is independent of the level of risk. Therefore, as is well-known, the preferred risk level
of a risk averse principal is a = 0: the principal would chose to eliminate all risk were
it possible to do so. If the agent instead has a preferred risk level a > 0, I say that
the agent has a preference for excess risk, in the sense that her preferred level of risk
is excessive from the perspective of the principal.
If I x the e¤ort level of the agent at e > 0 then the rst-order condition (7) leads to
the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 For a xed level of e¤ort it holds that:
i) If t ≤ e then a = 0;
ii) If t > e then a > 0;
iii) If a > 0 then Z > 0 > Y .
Noting that e is expected output, part (i) of Proposition 2 shows that for target
levels below expected output intrinsic motivation is locally concave so the agent does
not have a preference for excess risk. This conforms to the prediction of standard
economic theory.
However, part (ii) of the Proposition shows that if the target exceeds expected output,
intrinsic motivation is locally convex, so a = 0 is never optimal: the agent has a
preference for excess risk. Note, however, that the agents optimal risk level is nite,
so behavior is di¤erent from that implied by risk-seeking preferences in standard
theory, whereby the agent would choose an unbounded level of excess risk. Here
the existence of a non-zero, but nite, optimal level of excess risk arises from the
assumption of diminishing sensitivity, which implies alternative risk attitudes over
outcomes above and below the target level.
A possible example of part (ii) is the British trader Nick Leeson who brought down
Barings Bank in 1995 after losing around $1.3 billion while attempting to eradicate
hidden debts. Leesons target appears to have been the break-even level. As his
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position moved further from this target he entered into a series of increasingly spec-
ulative gambles worth more than the entire reserves of the Bank. Serious incidents
of a similar nature have occurred in other major nancial institutions, although their
exact frequency is unknown (see e.g. Shapira, 2002).7
Part (iii) is essentially a corollary of part (ii), stating that when the optimal value of
a is positive, it must be that Z > 0 > Y . To see this, note that if Y, Z > 0 then all
outcomes fall on the concave interval of intrinsic motivation, so an interior maximum
is never optimal. Conversely, a nite level of risk is never optimal if Y, Z < 0 as
all outcomes fall on the convex interval of intrinsic motivation. Therefore, for the
optimal level of risk to be positive but nite, it must be that some outcomes lie on
the convex interval of intrinsic motivation and others lie on the concave interval of
intrinsic motivation.
It is important to note that the preference for risk-taking when the target exceeds
expected output arises even in a model where risk-taking is completely decoupled from
expected output. Accommodating a positive relationship between expected output
and risk-taking would only strengthen this e¤ect.
Loss aversion acts as a restraint on risk-taking. An increase in a increases the prob-
ability of achieving the target level, but simultaneously exposes the agent to greater
downside risk. This downside risk looms larger under loss aversion than would be the
case if gains and losses were treated symmetrically, thereby checking the preferred
level of risk.
I now investigate the comparative static properties of the optimal risk level for the
case when a > 0. These I summarize in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 For interior solutions to the problem given by (2) it holds that:
at > 1; ae < 0.
Proposition 3 shows that the agents preferred risk level is increasing in the target
level. Moreover, I am able not only to sign this relationship, but also to show that the
7Proposition 2 is also consistent with evidence in Thaler and Johnson (1990) that the same
individual can be observed to sometimes accept a fair gamble, and other times reject it. Here this
phenomena can be explained by the additional contextual dimension provided by the target level.
By contrast, standard theory would suggest the gamble is always rejected.
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response of the optimal risk level to a change in the target level is greater than one-for-
one. This result is a strong and testable prediction, for the environment specied by
the model is amenable to experimental replication. However, owing to the simplifying
assumptions I employ to maintain tractability, direct testing against empirical data
would require great caution.
To gain some intuition for Proposition 3 note that in the unconstrained problem, for
a given level of e¤ort, the probability of at least achieving the target level is given by:
P (e+ ε ≥ t) =


0
1
2
 
1 + e−t
a

1
Z > Y > 0
Z > 0 > Y
0 > Z > Y
. (12)
Note from (12) that, for a xed level of e¤ort and Z > 0 > Y , if a does not increase
in response to an increase in t, then the probability of achieving the target converges
to zero, which cannot be optimal. Moreover, a must respond more than one-for-one
to increases in t in order to prevent (12) converging to zero.8 The Proposition also
states that risk-taking and e¤ort are substitutes. The intuition for this can again be
seen from (12), where both e¤ort and risk enter positively, such that maintaining a
constant probability of achieving the target can alternatively be achieved by bearing
more risk or increasing e¤ort.
4.3 Agents Optimum
Having examined e¤ort and risk-taking in isolation, I now consider the agents simul-
taneous choice of e¤ort and unsystematic risk. The comparative static properties of
the agents unconstrained optimum can now be summarized in the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 4 For the unconstrained problem given by (2), it holds that:
at

= 0 t ≤ e
> 0 t > e
; et

> 0 t ≤ e
< 0 t > e
.
Combining the intuitions behind earlier propositions, Proposition 4 states that when
the target level is in excess of expected output, further increases in the target level
8This can be seen by setting (12) equal to a constant and di¤erentiating. I then have that
∂a/∂t = a/ (t− e), which implies that ∂a/∂t > 1 ⇔ Z > 0, where the r.h.s. is satised since
Z > 0 > Y .
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induce the agent to reduce e¤ort and acquire a stronger preference for excess risk.
However, when the target is at or below expected output, the agent does not have
a preference for excess risk and responds to increases in the target by increasing
e¤ort. This result has potentially important ramications for the principal, who
can therefore benet from an appropriately set target, but can be exposed to both
declining productivity and excessive risk if the performance target is set excessively
high.
It remains to deduce the comparative static properties of A, the agents constrained
choice of risk. Combining (3) and Proposition 4 I have that
At =

0
at > 0
a < α
a ≥ α
. (13)
From (3) I have that A = α for all a < α, so clearly At = 0 on this interval. For
a ≥ α I have that A = a, so also At = at.
4.4 Optimal Target Level
In this section I now analyze the problem of the principal. I have the following
Proposition:
Proposition 5 At the equilibrium between the principal and agent it holds that:
i) The principals choice of t satises
t > e;
ii) The agents choice of (A, e) satises
A = α; e = emax.
Proposition 5 shows that the principal chooses the performance target to maximize
the agents e¤ort. More interestingly, it shows that the e¤ort-maximizing performance
target will lie above expected output. The intuition for Proposition 5 can be seen from
the principals utility in (10). Suppose that the solution to the agents unconstrained
problem satises a < α. In this case, from (3), the best the agent can do is to set
A = α. It follows from (13) that At = 0, so - by Proposition 4 - the agent will
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respond to an increase in the target level by raising e¤ort, and holding the level of
risk constant. The principals utility is therefore increasing in the target level.
Now suppose a ≥ α, then the agent sets A = a, so from (13) it follows that At > 0.
Then - by Proposition 4 - the agent will respond to an increase in the target level by
choosing a greater level of risk and by reducing her e¤ort. A reduction in e¤ort lowers
the principals utility, as must an increase in risk since the principal is risk averse. It
follows that the principals utility is decreasing in the target level.
A straightforward corollary of these two sets of arguments is that the optimal target
level must be where A = a = α, at which point e¤ort is maximized and - since the
agents preferred risk level matches the level of systematic risk - the principal bears
no unsystematic risk. From Proposition 2 it follows that, since the principals optimal
target level satises a > 0, it must be that t > e.
The nding that the principals optimal target level exceeds expected output arises
from the interaction of loss aversion and systematic risk. The presence of systematic
risk constrains the ability of the agent to substitute risk for e¤ort, thereby creating
an interval of target levels above expected output at which the agents optimal e¤ort
is still increasing in the target level. The size of this interval is dependent upon
the degree of loss aversion: strong loss aversion discourages the agent from risk-
taking and therefore expands the interval on which e¤ort is increasing. Conversely,
weak loss aversion (when outcomes above and below the target are treated close to
symmetrically), implies a greater readiness to take risk, which correspondingly reduces
the interval on which e¤ort is increasing.
5 Conclusion
Growing economic and psychological evidence suggests that performance targets can
act as an incentive device even in the absence of monetary rewards conditional on
achieving the target. I model this phenomenon by appealing to the notion of intrinsic
motivation to work - which can be importantly a¤ected by targets through their
inuence on an individuals perceived competence, and their esteem with colleagues.
The psychological literature nds that targets lead to increased e¤ort over most of
the range, but can lead to decreased e¤ort at high levels. Also, tougher targets induce
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agents to take greater risks. Traditional decision theory is not consistent with these
ndings, but I show here that an approach based on the insights of prospect theory
is.
In a setting in which the principal can choose the agents performance target I nd
that the optimal target level chosen by the principal lies above expected output.
This arises because the principal has an incentive to exploit the agents loss aversion
over below-target outcomes in an environment where the presence of systematic risk
constrains the agents ability to substitute risk for e¤ort.
There are a number of avenues for possible further research: the prediction made by
the model that risk-taking responds more than proportionately to increases in the
target level is amenable to an experimental test. Additionally, the analysis could
be extended to a dynamic setting with repeated interactions between principals and
agents. There is evidence that target levels set within organizations adapt over time
to reect actual performance (Lant, 1992; Lant and Hurley, 1999). One way such
adaptation might be generated in the current model is if agents di¤er in unobserved
productivity, such that the principal must use information from past outcomes to
infer an agents productivity, and hence the agents optimal target level.
A dynamic setting might also raise issues relating to fairness and trust in the principal-
agent relationship. For instance, setting targets that will not on average be achieved
in equilibrium could be perceived as manipulative or unethical by the agent. The
principal might therefore have an incentive to lower the target so as not to violate
fairness norms in the principal-agent relationship. The managers interviewed in Be-
wley (1999) argue that fairness is important to productivity through its impact on
morale. More generally, having agents fail against their targets too regularly might
be expected to have a long-run impact on job satisfaction and work morale. Both
factors could be expected to reduce productivity and increase labor turnover.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From (5) I have that Z > Y , so by diminishing sensitivity, Z > Y > 0 ⇒ I ′ [Y ] >
I ′ [Z] and 0 > Z > Y ⇒ I ′ [Y ] < I ′ [Z]. From (11) - and since the denominator is
negative by assumption - I have that et ≷ 0⇔ I
′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z] ≷ 0. Therefore:
Z > Y > 0⇒ I ′ [Y ] > I ′ [Z]⇔ et > 0
Z > 0 > Y ⇒ I ′ [Y ] ≷ I ′ [Z]⇔ et ≷ 0
0 > Z > Y ⇒ I ′ [Y ] < I ′ [Z]⇔ et < 0
It remains to show that et is initially increasing for low values of t and decreasing
for high values. This requires that the optimum satisfy ∂
∂t
(I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z]) < 0. I
have that ∂
∂t
(I ′ [Y [t, e [t]]]− I ′ [Z [t, e [t]]]) = YtI
′′ [Y ]+ZtI
′′ [Z]. Then I ′′ [Y ] > 0 and
I ′′ [Z] < 0 and:
Yt [t, e [t]] = Zt [t, e [t]] = et − 1 = −
2ac′′ [e]
I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z] + 2ac′′ [e]
< 0.
It follows that ∂
∂t
(I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z]) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
i) Suppose e− t ≥ 0. Di¤erentiating the maximand in (2) with respect to a gives
∂E [I]
∂a
=

1
2a2

a (I [Z] + I [Y ])−
Z Z
Y
I [ϕ] dϕ

.
Using LHopitals rule I have that lima↓0
∂E[I]
∂a
= lima↓0
 
1
4

(I ′ [Z]− I ′ [Y ]). Note that
e− t ≥ 0⇔ Z+Y ≥ 0 and e− t ≥ 0⇒ Z > 0, so Z > 0 and Y ∈ [−Z,Z). Therefore,
by loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, it must be that I ′ [Z] − I ′ [Y ] < 0. It
follows that lima↓0
∂E[I]
∂a
< 0 so the limit at zero is approached from below, and a = 0
is a local maximum. The second-order condition at stationary points is given by
1
2a
(I ′ [Z]− I ′ [Y ]), implying that any stationary point of ∂E[I]
∂a
is a local maximum.
As there cannot be two local maxima without an intervening local minimum, a = 0
is the only local maximum.
26
ii) If instead e− t < 0 then Z + Y < 0. As a ↓ 0 I have that Y < 0 and Z < 0, so by
diminishing sensitivity I ′ [Z]− I ′ [Y ] > 0. Then lima↓0
∂E[I]
∂a
> 0 implying that a = 0
is a local minimum. Therefore, all local maxima must satisfy a > 0.
iii) Note from (9) that I ′ [Y ] > I ′ [Z] at the optimum and, from (i, ii), that a >
0 ⇒ e − t < 0 ⇒ Y + Z < 0. The latter condition implies that Y , Z cannot both
be positive. Neither can Y, Z both be negative, for Z > Y from (5), so diminishing
sensitivity would imply I ′ [Z] > I ′ [Y ]. It follows that Z > 0 > Y .
Proof of Proposition 3
From assumptions A0 and A3 and the denitions of concavity and convexity (Chiang,
1984; p. 345), I have that Z > 0⇒ I [Z]−ZI ′ [Z] > 0 and Y < 0⇒ Y I ′ [Y ]−I [Y ] >
0. Di¤erentiating (7) I have
at =
2 (I [Z]− ZI ′ [Z] + Y I ′ [Y ]− I [Y ])− (Y + Z) (I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z])
(Z − Y ) (I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z])
> 0,
(A.1)
ae = −at < 0.
From (A.1) I have that at > 1⇔ I [Z]− I [Y ]− (Z − Y ) I
′ [Y ] > 0. Second note that
Zt [t, a [t]] = at − 1 =
2 (I [Z]− I [Y ]− (Z − Y ) I ′ [Y ])
(Z − Y ) (I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z])
,
so Zt [t, a [t]] > 0⇔ I [Z]−I [Y ]− (Z − Y ) I
′ [Y ] > 0. Establishing at > 1 is therefore
equivalent to establishing Zt [t, a [t]] > 0. From the proof of Proposition 2 I know
that all interior optima satisfy t > e (which implies Z + Y < 0) and from (9) I know
that I ′ [Y ] > I ′ [Z]. Initially consider the limiting case where t ↓ e, where it holds
that lim
t↓e
Z = lim
t↓e
Y = 0. Suppose I now increase t: since Yt [t, a [t]] = −at − 1 < 0
I know that Y becomes negative. However, Z cannot also fall, for if both Y and Z
were negative diminishing sensitivity would imply I ′ [Z] > I ′ [Y ]. Nor can Z remain
constant at zero and still satisfy the rst-order condition with respect to a, since
∂E[I]
∂a
|Z=0,Y <0 = −
1
4a2

Y I [Y ] + 2
R 0
Y
I [ϕ] dϕ

< 0. It follows that Z is increasing in
the neighborhood of t = e. I now show that Zt [t, a [t]] > 0 everywhere. Let Z be
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implicitly dened by I

Z

− I [Y ]−
 
Z − Y

I ′ [Y ] = 0. Note that
Zt [t, a [t]] =
Yt [t, a [t]]

I ′′ [Y ]
 
Z − Y
	
I ′′ [Y ]− I ′′ [Z]
> 0.
Since I [Z]− I [Y ]− (Z − Y ) I ′ [Y ] is decreasing in Z, using the denition of Z gives
that Z < Z ⇔ I [Z]−I [Y ]−(Z − Y ) I ′ [Y ] > 0. Previous arguments have established
that Z < Z holds in the neighborhood of t = e. However, as t is allowed to increase
it must remain the case that Z < Z since limZ↑ Z Zt = 0 < Zt. Therefore Z < Z
everywhere, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
When a = 0 the problem (2) collapses to max
e
I [e− t]−c [e] with rst-order condition
I ′ [e− t]− c′ [e] = 0, (A.2)
and second-order condition I ′′ [e− t]− c′′ [e] < 0. For internal optima I use standard
comparative static methods on the rst-order conditions (6), (7) and (A.2). I then
obtain:
at =


0 t ≤ e
c′′[e](ψ+φ)
|H|
> 0 t > e
; et =


− I
′′[e−t]
c′′[e]−I′′[e−t]
> 0 t ≤ e
− 4ψφ
(Z−Y )2|H|
< 0 t > e
;
where |H| > 0 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix and:
φ ≡ I [Z]− I [Y ]− (Z − Y ) I ′ [Z] > 0; ψ ≡ φ− (Z − Y ) (I ′ [Y ]− I ′ [Z]) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose the unconstrained solution to (2) is such that a < α, then At = 0 and et > 0.
It follows that the principals utility (10) is increasing in t. Now suppose a ≥ α,
then At > 0 and et < 0. It follows that the principals utility is decreasing in t. The
principals utility is therefore maximized where A = a = α. Since a > 0 the optimal
target level satises t > e by Proposition 2.
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